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ABSTRACT
Objective To establish mortality from pandemic A/H1N1
2009 influenza up to 8 November 2009.
Design Investigation of all reported deaths related to
pandemic A/H1N1 in England.
Setting Mandatory reporting systems established in
acute hospitals and primary care.
Participants Physicians responsible for the patient.
Main outcome measures Numbers of deaths from
influenzacombinedwithmid-rangeestimatesofnumbers
ofcasesofinfluenzatocalculateagespecificcasefatality
rates. Underlying conditions, time course of illness, and
antiviral treatment.
ResultsWith the official mid-range estimate for incidence
of pandemic A/H1N1, the overall estimated case fatality
rate was 26 (range 11-66) per 100000. It was lowest for
children aged 5-14 (11 (range 3-36) per 100000) and
highest for those aged ≥65 (980 (range 300-3200) per
100000).Inthe138peopleinwhomtheconfirmedcause
of death was pandemic A/H1N1, the median age was 39
(interquartile range 17-57). Two thirds of patients who
died(92,67%)wouldnowbeeligibleforthefirstphaseof
vaccination in England. Fifty (36%) had no, or only mild,
pre-existing illness. Most patients (108, 78%) had been
prescribed antiviral drugs, but of these, 82 (76%) did not
receive them within the first 48 hours of illness.
Conclusions Viewed statistically, mortality in this
pandemic compares favourably with 20th century
influenza pandemics. A lower population impact than
previous pandemics, however, is not a justification for
public health inaction. Our data support the priority
vaccination of high risk groups. We observed delayed
antiviral use in most fatal cases, which suggests an
opportunity to reduce deaths by making timely antiviral
treatment available, although the lack of a control group
limits the ability to extrapolate from this observation.
Given that a substantial minority of deaths occur in
previously healthy people, there is a case for extending
the vaccination programme and for continuing to make
early antiviral treatment widely available.
INTRODUCTION
On 11 June 2009 the World Health Organization for-
mally confirmed the first pandemic of influenza for
40 years.
1 The novel pandemic A/H1N1 virus, which
contains swine, avian, and human elements,
2 began to
cause illness in the United Kingdom about a month
3
after it first emerged in Mexico
4 in March 2009.
IntheUK,influenzarelatedmortalityistraditionally
calculated with the national system of vital statistics.
This is achieved by analysing death certificates or by
deriving a statistical estimate of influenza related mor-
tality based on all cause “excess mortality.”
5 When
numbers are small, measures of excess mortality are
of limited use in estimating deaths from influenza in
adults. Estimates based on death certificates might be
subjecttoadelayofweeksanddependontheaccuracy
and completeness of death certificates, which are
known to be unreliable.
6 So far, mortality associated
with pandemic A/H1N1 2009 influenza (here after
referred to as pandemic A/H1N1) has been reported
withvariablecompletenessworldwide
7and inparticu-
lar subgroups,including inpatients,
8 patients in critical
care,
9-11 pregnant women,
12 and children.
13
To obtain timely and accurate information on all
deaths,the chief medicalofficer for Englandinstigated
an investigation of every death in England considered
toberelatedtopandemicA/H1N1.Weanalysedthese
data, describing all reported deaths related to pan-
demic A/H1N1 infection in England by 8 November
2009.
METHODS
All acute hospitals in England’s National Health Ser-
vice (NHS) report their daily bed capacity to the
Department of Health during winter months. With
the onset of the pandemic, from the 7 July 2009 acute
hospitals were asked to use this system to report sus-
pected and confirmed deaths from pandemic
A/H1N1.On14August2009,aseparatereportingsys-
tem was established for deaths occurring outside acute
hospitals. This required staff in each of the primary
caretrustsinEnglandtocontacteverygeneralpractice
in their region to ascertain any such cases. The first
such report captured community deaths retrospec-
tively from the start of the pandemic. The reporting
cycle was subsequently repeated every week. Reports
fromacutehospitalsandfromprimarycaretrustswere
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made. Deaths in acute hospitals before 7 July 2009
were ascertained through the Health Protection
Agency’s flu reference centres and cross checked
with records held by the directors of public health in
each English health region.
Six physicians working for the chief medical officer
receivedthereportsofdeathssuspectedtoberelatedto
pandemicA/H1N1.Theymadedirectcontactwiththe
responsible senior physician in the organisation
reporting a death. They collected a standard informa-
tion set from this physician (box). The American
Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA) scale was used to
describethepatient’sgeneralhealthbeforetheonsetof
influenza.
14
A confirmed death was defined as related to pan-
demic A/H1N1 if either or both of the following cri-
teria were met: pandemic A/H1N1 infection recorded
onanypartofapatient’sdeathcertificate(orsynonym,
such as “swine flu,”“ H1N1 pneumonia,”“ H1N1
virus,” or other phrase clearly referring to pandemic
A/H1N1 in the clinical circumstances) or pandemic
A/H1N1 infection confirmed by laboratory testing,
either before or after death.
While the number of cases of pandemic A/H1N1 in
England was small, the Health Protection Agency
ascertained numbers from laboratory testing of all
known suspected cases. On 15 July, the agency started
weekly estimation of incident case numbers using two
primary care surveillance networks.
15 Estimates date
back to 2 June 2009. Before this there were 225 con-
firmedcasesinEngland.
16Consultationratesforinflu-
enza-like illness were recorded by the QSurveillance
NationalSurveillanceSystem.Thiscaptureselectronic
clinical record data for about 20 million patients in
England registered with a general practitioner.
17 The
Royal College of General Practitioners and Health
Protection Agency’s regional microbiology network
sentinel surveillance scheme estimated positivity
rates of pandemic A/H1N1 based on laboratory test-
ingofasampleofpatientswithinfluenza-likeillness,by
regionandbyagegroup.Toestimatecasenumbersfor
the whole of England, rates were multipled by consul-
tationratesforinfluenza-likeillnessand scaledupwith
the most recent population estimates from the Office
for National Statistics. The estimate was further scaled
up to account for the proportion of individuals with
symptomatic pandemic A/H1N1 who did not consult
theirgeneralpractitioner.Thisproportionwastakento
be 50-80%.
On23July2009,theNationalPandemicFluService
(NPFS) was activated in England. This is a telephone
and internet based service. It provides treatment
advice with a standardised algorithm, and, when
appropriate, authorises individuals to obtain antiviral
drugsfromalocalcollectionpoint.TheHealthProtec-
tionAgency’smethodofestimationthereforechanged
from this date. The number of individuals authorised
by the flu service to collect antiviral drugs was multi-
plied by positivity rates of pandemicA/H1N1 derived
from a sample of these individuals. This provided an
estimated number of true positive cases. This weekly
estimate was added to the weekly estimate derived
from primary care surveillance. The two were scaled
up to account for those individuals with symptomatic
infection who neither consulted their general practi-
tioner nor used the flu service. This proportion was
estimated at 30-70%. Hence, age specific estimates of
the total number of incident symptomatic cases in the
population were made on a weekly basis.
We used the estimates of case numbers and the
demographic information gathered about deaths to
calculate age specific case fatality rates. To account
for the lag between onset of symptoms and death,
18
we used the cumulative number of cases until the
date two weeks before 8 November 2009. Two weeks
is the approximate time period observed between
onset of symptoms and death. Sensitivity analyses
were performed to test the impact of censoring at one
week and four weeks.
The Health Protection Agency’s upper and lower
estimates for the cumulative number of cases by age
were used to calculate lower and upper estimates for
the case fatality rates. A 95% confidence interval was
calculated around these estimates to account for the
uncertainty around the observed number of deaths.
19
The case fatality ranges we have presented refer to the
upper95%confidencelimitoftheupperestimateofthe
case fatalityrate andthe lower 95% confidencelimit of
the lower estimate of the case fatality rate. We used
mid-range population estimates for England from the
Office for National Statistics
20 to calculate the cumula-
tiveincidenceofcasesandthepopulationriskofdeath.
We determined whether the dead patient would
havebeeneligibleforthecurrent(phase1)vaccination
programme in England based on their age and under-
lying conditions.
2122 The Department of Health has
estimated that 9.31 million people in England are eli-
gible. We estimated the length of stay in hospital and
intensive care units by subtracting the date of admis-
siontohospitalorintensivecarefromthedateofdeath.
In England all deaths are recorded on a standard
death certificate, which distinguishes between direct
causality and contributory factors. Part I of the certifi-
cate records diseases or conditions directly leading to
deathinacausalchainwithuptothreeelements,where
Data collected for every reported death
U n i q u ep a t i e n ti d e n t i f i e r( N H Sn u m b e ro rh o s p i t a ln u m b e r )
Hospital or primary care trust
Demographics (age/sex)
Results of microbiological tests for pandemic A/H1N1
Cause of death reported on death certificate
Time course of illness (date of symptom onset, hospital admission, intensive care
admission, start of of antiviral drugs)
Pre-morbid health status (ASA grade)
Underlying medical conditions listed by organ system
Malignancy, immunosuppresion, and pregnancy (directly sought risk factors)
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1b is a disease or condition leading to 1a, and 1c is a
diseaseorconditionleadingto1b.PartIIrecordsother
relevant conditions contributing to the death but not
related to the disease or condition causing it. Death
certificates were also analysed according to the meth-
ods of ICD-10 (international classification of diseases,
10th revision),
23 used nationally and internationally to
producenationalmortalitystatistics.
24Thisdetermines
an “underlying cause of death” from the causal chain
and contributingconditionsreportedonthe deathcer-
tificate.
RESULTS
Initial reports of 208 deaths between 1 June and 8
November 2009 were received. Of these, 138 met the
case definition as being related to pandemic A/H1N1.
The others were excluded from analysis because the
initialclinicalsuspicionwasnotborneoutbyinvestiga-
tion and hence the case definition was not met (n=56)
orbecausetheydidnotyetfulfilthecasedefinitionbut
death certification or results of postmortem tests were
outstanding (n=14).
An estimated 540000 people (range 240000-
1100000) in England had symptomatic pandemic
A/H1N1 infection in the study period. With this
denominator, the case fatality rate was 26 (11-66)
deaths per 100000 cases. On a general population
basis over the same period, there were 1100 (400-
2200) cases per 100000 people and 2.7 (95% confi-
dence interval 2.2 to 3.2) deaths per million (table 1).
Fig 1 shows the number of deaths occurring in each
week and the mid-point estimate of case numbers.
The time distribution of cases follows a classic epi-
demic curve, with a peak in July, and a second wave
in October and November. The time distribution of
deaths is similar, with deaths in the first wave peaking
two to three weeks after the peak of cases.
A sensitivity analysis censoring cases one week
before death yielded a similar case fatality rate of 22
(range 9-56) deaths per 100000 cases. Censoring at
four weeks yielded a case fatality rate of 34 (14-90)
deaths per 100000. If we included all the 14 deaths
currently under investigation, censoring at two
weeks, the case fatality would rise to 28 (12-72).
Demographic and clinical characteristics
Patients who died ranged in age from 0 to 88 (median
39,interquartilerange17-57).Casefatalityratesvaried
between age groups (table 1). The ≥65 age group had
thelowestestimatedincidenceratebutthehighestcase
fatality rate. Conversely, those aged 5-14 and 15-24
had the highest estimated incidence rates and the low-
est estimated case fatality rates. There was no signifi-
cant difference in the risk of death between males (3.0
deathspermillion)andfemales(2.4deathspermillion)
(Pearson χ
2=1.7, df=1, P=0.22).
Before contracting pandemic A/H1NI, over a third
ofthosewhodiedwereeitherpreviouslyhealthy(ASA
grade one, 19%, 26/138) or had mild systemic disease
that did not limit their activity (ASA grade two, 17%,
24/138). Two thirds had severe (ASA grade three,
33%, 46/138) or incapacitating (ASA grade four,
30%, 42/138) underlying systemic disease. Patients at
the extremes of age (<5 and ≥65) had poorer pre-mor-
bid health as assessed by ASA grade (fig 2).
Patients who died had a median of two long term
conditions or risk factors (26 had no risk factors or
long term conditions, 32 had one, 34 had two, 31 had
three,7hadfour,4hadfive,2hadsix,and2hadseven).
Chronic respiratory disease and neurodevelopmental
disorderswerethemostcommonlyreportedlongterm
conditions (table 2). The median age of patients was 8
(interquartile range 2-19, n=25) in those with a
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Fig 1 | Weekly estimated incidence of pandemic A/H1N1 cases (mid-range estimates) and
confirmed deaths in England (source: Health Protection Agency)
Table 1 |Age specific indices of incidence of and mortality from pandemic A/H1N1 in 2009. All population and case estimates rounded to nearest 1000
Age group
(years)
Population*
(1000s)
Cases (estimated) No of deaths
Case fatality rate
deaths per 100 000
cases (range)
Population risk of death
deaths per 1 000 000
population(exact95%CI) No(range)(1000s)
Cumulative
incidence per
100000population Total Male Female
<1 641 7 (3-13) 1000 2 1 1 30 (2-260) 3.1 (0.3 to 11.3)
1-4 2398 26 (12-53) 1100 7 3 4 27 (3-120) 2.9 (1.1 to 6.1)
5-14 5961 187 (86-381) 3100 20 7 13 11 (3-36) 3.4 (2.0 to 5.2)
15-24 6812 144 (67-297) 2100 17 8 9 12 (3-40) 2.5 (1.4 to 4.0)
25-44 14 460 125 (58-297) 850 37 21 16 30 (10-88) 2.6 (1.8 to 3.5)
45-64 12 661 45 (21-92) 350 29 21 8 65 (21-200) 2.3 (1.5 to 3.3)
≥65 8159 3 (1-5) 30 26 14 12 980 (300-3200) 3.2 (2.0 to 4.7)
All ages 51 092 536 (247-1097) 1100 138 75 63 26 (11-66) 2.7 (2.2 to 3.2)
*From Office for National Statistics mid-population estimates 2007.
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those with asthma, and 64 (48-74, n=13) in those with
COPD(chronicobstructivepulmonarydisease).Ofall
those who died, 67% (92/138) fell into one of the risk
categories eligible for the first phase of vaccination in
England. The population risk of death for those falling
into a vaccination group (9.9 per million people) was
ninetimesthatforthosenotinanatriskgroup(1.1per
millionpeople,Pearsonχ
2=217,df=1,P<0.001).Those
whowereaged≥65weremorelikelytofallintoaprior-
ity group for vaccination than those outside this age
group (24/26 v 68/112, P=0.002, Fisher’s exact test).
Time course of illness and treatment
In patients for whom a date of onset of symptoms was
stated, death occurred a median of 12 days (inter-
quartile range 5-19 days, n=114) after influenza-like
symptomsbegan.Atotalof125patientswereadmitted
to hospital, including one patient discharged who sub-
sequently died in the community. A further four
patientsdiedintheambulanceoronarrivalathospital.
The remainder (n=9) died in the community, having
been solely cared for in the community.
In those admitted to hospital with pandemic
A/H1N1, symptoms started a median of three days
before admission (1-5 days, n=111). Two patients
developed influenza-like symptoms while already in
hospital. The date of onset of symptoms was missing
or unclear for 12 patients admitted to hospital. After
the exclusion of four patients (two with hospital
acquired influenza, one discharged before death, and
one with date of admission missing), patients spent a
median of eight days in hospital (3-14 days, n=121).
Most patients admitted to hospital (82%, 103/125),
were treated in an intensive care unit at some stage,
dying a median of six days (2-14 days, n=103) after
admission to the unit.
Use of antiviral drugs
Of those who died, 78% (108/138) were prescribed
antiviraldrugs.Inthe94forwhomadateofsymptoms
was reported, patients started taking the drugs a
median of five days after symptoms began (inter-
quartile range2-8 days).Of those admittedto hospital,
9% (11/125) had started taking antiviral drugs before
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Fig 2 | Age and pre-morbid health of patients who died from
causes related to pandemic A/H1N1
Table 2 |History of long term conditions and other risk
factors among those dying from pandemic A/H1N1. Numbers
in parentheses indicate number with single long term
condition or risk factor
No of patients
Respiratory:
Asthma 15 (3)
COPD 13 (1)
Scoliosis 6 (0)
Restrictive disease 5 (0)
Bronchiectasis 4 (0)
Tracheostomy 2 (0)
Other 6 (0)
Cardiac:
Hypertension 13 (2)
Ischaemic cardiovascular disease 6 (1)
Heart failure 9 (1)
Other 6 (0)
Endocrine:
Diabetes mellitus 9 (0)
Obesity 11 (2)
Hypothyroidism 5 (0)
Haematological:
Leukaemia 6 (3)
Other haematological malignancy
Anaemia 6 (1)
Other 2 (0)
Non-haematological malignancy 5 (1)
Pregnancy 5 (3)
Neurological:
Cerebral palsy 8 (4)
Other neurodevelopmental disorder 17 (2)
Epilepsy 4 (0)
Stroke 3 (0)
Dementia 3 (0)
Spinal muscular atrophy 3 (1)
Quadriplegia 2 (0)
Other 4 (0)
Gastrointestinal:
Chronic liver disease 8 (4)
Percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy 8 (1)
Malnutrition 3 (0)
Ulcerative colitis 1 (0)
Other 8 (0)
Renal:
Chronic kidney disease 13 (0)
Other 3 (0)
Rheumatological:
Inflammatory disorders 7 (0)
Metabolic bone disease 2 (0)
Immunosuppression:
Drugs 19 (2)
HIV/AIDS 1 (0)
COPD=chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.
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(26/108) received them within the recommended 48
hours after onset of symptoms.Greateruse of antiviral
drugs was observed in patients who died in acute hos-
pitals than in those who died in the community (101/
125 v 7/13, P=0.04, Fisher’s exact test,).
Death certification
In11casesthedeathcertificatehadnotyetbeenissued
because a coroner’s investigation was ongoing (8%,
11/138). Table 3 reports the position of pandemic
A/H1N1 on the 127 death certificates issued. When
we analysed all available death certificates using the
ICD-10 methods used to produce mortality data, the
underlying cause of 39% of deaths (49/127) would be
classified as influenza.
We further analysed death certificates that recorded
pandemicA/H1N1inthecausalchainleadingdirectly
todeath(n=74)(table 4).Thedirectcauseofdeathwas
recorded as pandemicA/H1N1 (or some synonym) in
43% of thesecases (32/74). In 11% of cases (8/74) pan-
demicA/H1N1wasthesoleconditionrecordedonthe
death certificate. In most cases, the direct cause of
death was a respiratory condition (76%, 56/74).
DISCUSSION
By 8 November, about 1% of England’s population
had had symptomatic pandemic A/H1N1 2009 infec-
tion (estimated range 0.5-2.2%). We estimate that
0.026% (range 0.011-0.066%) of these individuals
died from causes related to this infection. Most (64%)
of those who died had severe or incapacitating under-
lying disease. The risk of contracting and dying from
pandemic A/H1N1 was nine times greater for people
in one of the high risk groups currently being offered
vaccination than for the rest of the population. A con-
siderable minority of those who died, however, were
largely healthy. Most of those who died received anti-
viral drugs, but many did not receive them within the
recommended 48 hour window.
Value of clinical reporting systems
Establishing a standardised reporting and case by case
investigation mechanism across a whole country’s
health service has enabled us to collect mortality data
in a manner impossible in previous influenza pan-
demics and in many other countries today. It aimed
to achieve as near complete ascertainment of cases as
possible. Although the method did not capture deaths
inindependentsectorhospitals,nearlyallacutecarein
EnglandisprovidedbytheNHS.
25Under-reportingof
deaths is possible because cases are either not recog-
nised or not reported. Mandatory reporting systems,
requiring a “nil report” in the absence of a positive
daily or weekly report, were instigated to minimise
this risk. Similarly, under-reporting of comorbidities
is a possibility, particularly among older people,
because they might have been undiagnosed or not
known to the physicians caring for the patient in their
terminal illness. The presence of obesity was not spe-
cifically asked for and might therefore be under-
reported. Inevitable delay in confirming or refuting
the causation of some deaths might hamper the esti-
mate of case fatality rate. There were, however, only
14 deaths in this category and so the effect on the esti-
mate is not substantial.
These national reporting systems were established
early in the pandemic. They were designed to be man-
ageable for clinicians potentially faced with far greater
numbers of deaths. Gathering more detailed clinical
information would have been useful. Placing a high
burden of reporting detailed data on busy clinicians,
however, limits the accuracy of responses and the sus-
tainabilityofdatacollection.Hadweanticipatedsofew
deaths, we might also have asked clinicians to provide
information on surviving patients as controls. Our
method focused on capturing key public health infor-
mation. Comparisons with groups of patientswho sur-
vived will be important in gaining full benefit from the
data presented here.
Case fatality rates in influenza pandemics
The case fatality rate of 0.026% (range 0.011-0.066%)
computedby this analysisis lower thanmost estimates
made so far in this pandemic but is also based on a
different denominator. Most estimates have used
laboratory confirmed cases in their denominator,
resulting in rates of 0.1-0.9%.
726-28 Confining the
denominator to laboratory confirmed cases will pro-
vide a gross underestimate of the incidence of true
Table 3 |Microbiological testing and death certification of included deaths
Record of “pandemic A/H1N1” or
synonym on death certificate
Confirmation of pandemic A/H1N1 by microbiological test
Positive result No test conducted Total
Recorded in part I (led directly to death) 70 4 74
Recorded in part II (contributed to death) 21 2 23
Not recorded on death certificate 30 NA 30
Death certificate not yet issued (coroner’s
investigation awaited)
11 NA 11
Total 132 6 138
NA=not applicable, does not meet case definition.
Table 4 |Certification of direct cause of death in cases in
which pandemic A/H1N1 infection was recorded within
causal chain leading to death
Certified direct cause of death No of cases (%)
Influenza 32 (43)
Pneumonia 14 (19)
Acute respiratory distress syndrome
(ARDS)
4 (5)
Pneumonia and ARDS 1 (1)
Other respiratory complications 5 (7)
Multi-organ failure 13 (18)
Intracranial haemorrhage (secondary to
anticoagulation for ECMO)
2 (3)
Myocardial infarction 1 (1)
Pulmonary embolism 1 (1)
Myocarditis 1 (1)
Total 74 (100)
ECMO=extracorporeal membrane oxygenation.
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timate of the fatality rate for symptomatic cases. One
Mexican study calculated a case fatality rate of 0.1%,
but the denominatorwasrestrictedto patientspresent-
ing to primary care.
28 The validity of this denominator
is questionable. Not all of these presentations would
have been caused by pandemic A/H1N1, not all peo-
ple with symptoms seek medical attention, and access
tocaremightbelimitedinpoorerareas.Amuchlower
estimateof0.005%(95%confidenceinterval0.003%to
0.01%) was made in New Zealand, based on an esti-
mate of symptomatic case numbers in the
population.
29 Given the move away from laboratory
testing of large numbers of cases, it seems sensible
that estimation of the case fatality rate should reflect
this. The estimates of case fatality rates in our study
have wide ranges, which reflect uncertainty about the
proportion of people with symptoms who do not seek
medical attention. If this proportion is higher than
thought, our case fatality rates might be an overesti-
mate. This proportion might have changed over time
as public attitudes to the pandemic have evolved. The
approach of using an estimate of total case numbers is
subject to greater uncertainty than solely counting
laboratory confirmed cases. As a measure, however,
it should provide a more meaningful estimate of the
case fatality rate among the symptomatic population
as a whole.
Our estimate of case fatality rate compares favour-
ablywiththoseinthethree20thcenturyinfluenzapan-
demics. The rate in the 1918-9 H1N1 pandemic was
2-3%. Rates in the subsequent pandemics (1957-8 and
1967-8) were in the order of 0.2%.
30 Estimates of num-
bers of deaths from previous pandemics are probably
less reliable than current estimates, being based only
on statistical methods and death certification. Labora-
tory confirmation of influenza viruses was not widely
available. Deaths from other circulating viruses might
also have been counted in the past. Improvements in
nutritional status, housing, and availability of health
care might explain some of the apparent decrease in
case fatality from one pandemic to the next. Since the
mostrecentpandemictherehavebeenmajoradvances
in intensive care medicine. In the current pandemic,
largenumbersofpatientsarebeingtreatedinintensive
care units, with survival rates in excess of 80%.
910
Many more patients might have died in England with-
out the ready availability of critical care support,
including mechanical ventilation.
Although the pandemic A/H1N1 virus represents
an antigenic shift of the type that characterises a pan-
demic, it did not result in a novel H and N code. The
virus shares similarities with H1N1 influenza viruses
that were circulating in the mid-20th century. The
population is therefore not entirely naive to the virus,
as could have been the case with a more substantial
antigenicshift.Thismightin partexplainthe lowfatal-
ity rates.
Ourdatasuggestaparticularlyhighcasefatalityrate
among those aged ≥65. Our age specific case fatality
rates follow a pattern similar to the J shaped
distribution described in the previous two
pandemics
31 and in a Mexican study of the current
pandemic.
28 The low absolute numbers of deaths and
cases,however,particularlyintheveryyoung,prevent
us drawing conclusions. The 1918-9 pandemic was
characterised by high case fatality additionally occur-
ring among young healthy adults.
32 There is no evi-
dence of this from our analysis of the current
pandemic.
Risk groups and vaccination
So far there have been an estimated 3000 cases of pan-
demic A/H1N1 among the eight million people aged
≥65 in England, with a case fatality rate of 1.0%. This
group therefore has the lowest incidence rate and the
highestcasefatalityrate.Thisfindingisconsistentwith
other analyses of confirmed cases and deaths during
this pandemic.
710 The population risk of death for
this age group is not significantly different from that
of any other age group. We note that almost all
(24/26) of the deaths in this age group were in people
in a risk group now eligible for vaccination. The low
incidence rate in this age group—seen consistently in
the southern hemisphere
33—might in part be because
of previous exposure to strains similar to pandemic
A/H1N1.
34 Without this previous exposure, the pan-
demicmighthavecausedmanymoredeathsinthisage
group. If the attack rate in the older population rises
over the winter, as it did in the 1957 pandemic,
3536 a
largernumberofdeathsmightbeanticipated.Thishas
not, however, been observed in the southern
hemisphere.
33
Our series shows that a high proportion of patients
(67%) fell into one of the risk groups identified for
phase one of the vaccination programme that is cur-
rently running in England. This finding supports the
importance of achieving high vaccination uptake for
these groups. This is consistent with the findings of a
Californian study, in which 75% of patients who died
had risk factors for complications of seasonal
influenza.
37 Other studies
81013 have identified similar
risk conditions, particularly asthma and other respira-
toryconditionsandneurodevelopmentalconditions.
13
Obesity seems under-represented in comparison with
other studies
810 and might reflect under-reporting in
our study because it was not recorded as a diagnosis
within the patient’s hospital record. Comparisons
with surviving infected patients or patients in hospital
will be important in allowing the risks associated with
particular underlying conditions to be further quanti-
fied.
Delayed use of antiviral drugs
While most patients received antiviral drugs, only a
minority received them within the recommended 48
hour window. Similar evidence of delays in the pre-
scription of antiviral drugs, and of less than universal
use, has emerged from recent studies of hospital
patients in the United States.
813 An analysis of 272
inpatients with A/H1N1 in the US suggests that use
of antiviral drugs confers a survival benefit,
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page 6 of 8 BMJ | ONLINE FIRST | bmj.comparticularly when they are started within two days of
onset of illness.
8 Although minimal, the risk of side
effects associated with use of antiviral drugs and vacci-
nation does become more important because the risk
associated with the disease is also low, particularly for
previouslyhealthypeople.Endpointsotherthandeath
(such as illness requiring time off work, admission to
hospital, admission to critical care) are also important.
Further cost benefit analyses would be valuable
although difficult, given the uncertainties of an evol-
ving pandemic.
Unreliability of death certification
Our analysis relied on the establishment of specific
national death reporting systems that are mandatory
for acute NHS hospitals and primary care. Reports
were made based on clinical suspicion to avoid the
risk of non-reporting when test results were awaited
at the time of death. Subsequent contact with the
responsible clinicians enabled us to discount or to
include these reports and to gather further clinical
information reliably and completely.
Every year, regression models are used to estimate
the number of deaths attributable to seasonal influ-
enza, based on variation in all cause excess
mortality.
53839 Other analyses rely on determining
cause of death from the death certificate.
40 Only 39%
of deaths included in this study would have been cap-
tured by this method of categorising deaths by under-
lyingcause.Theapproachweusedcomplementsthese
statistical approaches. Their use in combination could
be considered in monitoring future disease outbreaks.
Conclusions
Thefirstinfluenzapandemicofthe21stcenturyiscon-
siderably less lethal than was feared in advance. Case
fatality rates vary by age in a similar pattern to the two
previous pandemics but are currently much lower.
This is fortunate. The challenges of risk communica-
tion and of policy making remain.
Our findings lend support to a vaccination strategy
that prioritises high risk groups. They also show that a
substantial minority of deaths are occurring outside
these groups. Wider population vaccination therefore
merits consideration. Cost benefit analyses could
furtherassistthesedecisions.Thesearedifficulttocon-
duct and to interpret in the uncertain context of an
evolving pandemic.
We observed delayed antiviral use in most fatal
cases. The value of this observation is limited by the
absence of a control group, but it might be important.
It suggests value in making antiviral drugs readily
available to previously healthy people as well as to
those at high risk. This reinforces that where counter-
measures (antivirals, vaccines) are available, they
should be actively deployed. A lower population
impact than previous pandemics is not a justification
for public health inaction when death, serious illness,
and admission to hospital can be prevented.
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